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The three years since the start of EMU have been characterised by an extraordinary degree of
volatility in global financial and other markets (oil, etc.). Most official comments have so far
focused on the fact that Europe has remained an ‘island of stability’. But this self-
congratulatory tone cannot mask the fact that EU institutions have generally not been in the
forefront of the efforts to stabilise the global economy. This is partly understandable as most
of the volatility originated outside the EU. But just ‘putting one’s own house in order’ does
not seem to be sufficient when global economic (or political) stability is at stake, as recent
events amply demonstrate.
This note will concentrate on two particular aspects of this issue, namely 1) the absence of
the EU in the efforts to contain emerging markets’ volatility and 2) the inability of the EU to
develop a coherent strategy for the use of its economic instruments in the Middle East.
1) Over the last years the sharp swings in capital flows to emerging markets, which trigger
recurrent financial and banking crises, have constituted an important source of financial
instability. As these crises have at times affected global financial stability (Asia, Russia) and
have often directly affected EU interests, it is surprising that the EU has been completely
absent in the variety of efforts to deal with this phenomenon – at least in comparison with the
US. The attitude of the EU has so far been one of complete passivity. Since there is no direct
EU competence involved, the issue is left to individual member states, which act according to
their own perceived, national interests.
The result to date has been that no coherent EU position has been developed and defended,
even in cases where Europe’s strategic interests are clearly implicated, e.g. Turkey. By
contrast, the US authorities usually have well defined interests and views, and appear to be so
effective in influencing other institutions that at times it seemed as if the IMF was taking
orders from the US Treasury.
A similar process appears to be operating in the current discussions about the desirability of
establishing orderly bankruptcy proceedings for emerging markets facing debt problems.
According to recent press reports, the key to a solution is the US position.
The EU is also not using its financial muscle (or rather the financial means of its member
states) in an efficient and concerted way. The EU plus the 15 member states together provide
much more official development assistance than the US. But one would be hard pressed to
mention a single case of a non-European country of strategic importance whose position has
been swayed or heavily influenced by European aid.
There exists one EU instrument for directly channelling financial aid, the so-called Macro-
Financial Assistance (MFA). But this facility is limited in size and has de facto been only
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available for a small group of countries (mainly in Europe). For the few favoured recipients,
MFA is important despite the fact that it represents only a fraction of the total received from
member countries either directly (on a bilateral basis) or indirectly (via the IFIs). The main
instrument of the EU’s ‘financial foreign policy’, the Macro-Financial Assistance, is thus
only of limited use.
Why has the EU been invisible in efforts to resolve emerging market crises? Much of the
answer must be that the responsibility for fiscal policy and financial supervision remains
largely in national hands. The Maastricht Treaty was essentially inward-looking, paying great
attention to the distribution of competences within the EU, but ignoring almost completely
the external dimension. The fact that there are no direct EU competences implies that any
attempt to organise an EU input to efforts to resolve international financial crises would
require a very complex institutional set-up. Bundling national financial assistance could in
theory be achieved through informal coordination, but reality has shown that member states
guard jealously their ‘sovereignty’ in financial affairs. This is also the main reason why there
is no institutional mechanism to coordinate bilateral aid or positions at the IMF (as well as in
other IFIs).
1 The latter is especially important as it deprives the EU of crucial leverage; after
all, the sum of the quotas of EU-15 (or even the eurozone) is at around 30% – much larger
than the US quota (around 20%) in the Bretton-Woods institutions, IMF and World Bank.
Why this area is left to member countries can be explained by two distinct phenomena:
i)  The small country syndrome. No individual member country on its own can hope to
have a decisive influence on the global scene. There is therefore little incentive at the
member country level to spend the resources required to make policy proposals or
participate actively in the debate. Given the technical and analytical expertise that is
required in this area, an active participation in the policy process is possible only for
countries that develop and maintain a highly qualified staff over long periods.
ii)  Dis-economies of scale. As smaller member countries cannot have finance ministries of
the same size as the US, it is clear that their officials cannot specialise to the same
extent.  The manpower employed in the international departments of the 15 member
states greatly exceeds that employed by the US Treasury, but the work of all these
European officials is not coordinated and they often work at cross purposes, as they are
driven by domestic political and economic agendas.
In order to illustrate the practical difficulties that do not allow the EU to act, it is useful to go
through a concrete example. What would it take to establish an ‘EU’ position in a particular
crisis, e.g. Turkey or Argentina? This would require the co-operation of the ECB, national
ministries of finance (via the Economic and Financial Committee and ECOFIN), the
Commission and probably the European Parliament. None of these institutions operates with
a strong foreign policy background. Last, but certainly not least, the EU did not, until
recently, even have to pretend to have a common foreign policy. This has now changed, and
the EU has a foreign policy chief, but this person (and the office he represents) has no
standing in the ‘competent’ bodies (mainly the EFC and ECOFIN). Finance Ministers have a
tendency to be a law unto themselves in any event. They become especially reserved when
their colleagues from the Foreign Ministries try to invade their area with other concerns. This
is another difference with the US where the Treasury does take foreign policy considerations
into account.
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The case of Turkey illustrates clearly all the potential economic and political costs and
benefits. The joint banking and foreign exchange crisis that started in 2000-01 still poses a
risk of a breakdown of the social fabric. The tension seems to have subsided in early 2002,
but the danger remains. The EU could have played a key role in easing the financial plight of
the country, but this was never even considered. Member countries and the EU institutions
were quite content to leave the management of this crisis to the experts, i.e. the IMF. Given
that there is no EU expertise, nor any competence, to deal with these crises, this might have
been unavoidable. As there is no hint of a change of the situation in the foreseeable future,
however, one must conclude that for the time being the EU is not really an actor on the global
financial scene.
2) One might be tempted to argue: Why care about the fact that the EU has no pretension to
shape the global financial system? Would this affect the welfare of European citizens? It is
true that European citizens might not be much better off if crises in emerging markets were
solved by means of a model in which the European Union has a say, rather than one dictated
by the US alone. But there are other cases in which EU’s interests are more directly at stake
and where US and EU interests (or rather strategic approaches) differ sharply.
The deepening crisis in the Middle East is providing yet another illustration of this incapacity
of the EU to act in a coherent way. The EU is the most important trading partner of most
countries in this region, including Israel, with which it has strong economic relations (trade in
both directions is running at around $10 billion p.a. – see table below).
EU Trade with Israel, 2000    
  EU
Imports
($ mil.)
Share
(in %)
EU exports
($ mil.
Share
(in %)
Agriculture and Processed Foods 818 8.41 562 3.69
Fuels 262 2.69 344 2.26
Pharmaceuticals 399 4.1 345 2.27
Chemicals 1,432 14.72 1,663 10.92
Textiles, Clothing, Footwear 515 5.29 570 3.75
Jewels, etc. 1,995 20.5 3,923 25.77
Engineering 2,763 28.79 3,889 25.54
Equipment 804 8.27 2,058 13.52
Other 744 7.64 1,871 12.28
TOTAL bilateral trade 9,731 15,226
Memo item
Israeli
exports
Israeli
imports
Total bilateral as % of total Israeli
trade: 31.5 % 44.5 %
This trade is governed by an Association Agreement, which contains a clear reference to the
respect of human rights. Should the conflict escalate further, this article might have to be
invoked. The EU is also one of the main financial backers of the Palestinian Authority, to the
tune of several hundreds of millions of euro to date. The EU has thus certainly considerableDANIEL GROS
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economic leverage over both parties. This leverage has arisen as a by-product of disparate
policy initiatives, with little thought being given to whether it fits into a larger foreign policy
strategy. But before the EU can even consider using the economic instruments at its disposal
(trade preferences and financial aid, both cases of which are clearly an EU competence) it
should first make up its mind about what it wants. Just calling for peace and repeating the
mantra that UN resolutions should be implemented does not constitute a coherent policy.
What is needed is a clear formulation of the concrete actions the EU might undertake and
how it would react to an escalation of the conflict, regardless of its source. But no such plan
of action has been considered.
This is another example of the disappointingly modest ambitions of the EU to establish a
common foreign and security policy. It might not be of great importance for the future of
Europe whether the EU can participate actively in resolving the financial crises of emerging
markets, but an all-out war in the Middle East poses serious risks to the vital interests of
Europe.
Conclusions: All in all, it appears that the EU will remain largely a non-actor on the global
financial and economic stage. Compared to Japan, it can take consolation in the knowledge
that it has at least its own house mostly in order. But the EU remains ill-equipped to make an
active contribution to global financial stability. The EU is now developing its own rapid
reaction force, but nothing similar is even being thought of in the financial field. If the EU is
to be able to co-direct the global financial system together with the US, it must develop its
own expertise (‘planning assets’) in this field and create a mechanism to quickly mobilise the
vast financial resources of its member states.
Recent events in the Middle East have underscored how irrelevant the EU has become for
both parties. This can be changed rapidly only if the economic constitution of the EU is
amended to allow for the coordination of the available economic instruments with the
(hopefully strengthened) CFSP.ABOUT CEPS
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